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Summary
Tax sersitivity of foreign direct investment (FDI) has important
policy implications.  If FDI is not responsive to taxation, then it may be
an appropriate target for taxation by  the host country, which can  raise
revenue without sacrificing any economic benefits FDI produces.  For some
countries where the degree of FDI penetration is large, this can represent
a significant fraction of total tax revenues.  If, on the other hand, the
volume of FDI responds negatively to taxation, then the host countzy must
trade  off  the  revenue gains  of  increased taxation against the  economic
costs of discouraging FDI.
The  relevance  of  host  and  home  country  tax  regimes  for  FDI
transfers  and  reinvestments are  the subject of  considerable theoretical
controversy and  debate.  According  to  the "old" view,  both tax  regimes
matter  - the home  country tax  system is  relevant even  if a  subsidiary
finances its investments by reinvested earnings or by raising local debt.
This  is because  its  financing and  investment decisions affect home  tax
liability on dividends distributions.  An alternative view  (the so-called
"new" view  suggested by Hartman  (1985)) argues that in the case of FDI
financed by local debt or reinvested earnings, the home country tax rate is
irrelevant.  The reasoning is that any taxes due upon repatriation to the
home  country  reduce  equally  the  opportunity  cost  of  investment  (a
repatriated dividend) and the after-tax return to investment.  Thus it is
irrelevant for the incentive to invest.  Even under the new view, however,
the home country tax rate  would be relevant for  home country multinationals
that are contemplating a transfer of funds to a foreign subsidiary.- ii  -
These  questio.- have not  yet been examined empirically  for any
developing country.  The  empirical  literature on this  subject primarily
focuses on FDI in the USA and concludes that tax effects on FDI are quite
strong.  With one recent exception, none of these studies captures the home
country  regime  in  reaching  these  conclusions.  Furthermore,  in  the
literature,  the  disincentive to  investment caused by  the tax  system  is
generally implicitly measured  by an average tax rate, computed as total
taxes paid  divided by  a measure  of profits.  However, the incentive to
undertake  new  investment  depends upon  the effective marginal  tax  rate,
which can deviate substantially from an average tax rate concept.
An analysis of FDI in Mexico poses some unique problems but also
offers some unique analytical advartages.  Unique problems arise from the
historical  policy  emphasis  in  Mexico  on  "regulation"  (as opposed  to
promotion) of FDI.  Unique advantages arise from the fact that the USA is a
major contributor  (assumed to be marginal  investor) and therefore it  is
ssible to model  the home country tax regime in examining tax effects.
Having data from both Mexico and the USA make it possible to develop time
series  on  marginal  and  average  effective  tax  rates  for use  in  this
analysis.
This paper examines the effects of taxation on FDI in Mexico.  The
empirical  model  used  for  this  purposes  distinguishes  FDI  financed  by
transfers and retained earnings and incorporates  host and home country tax
and non-tax factors including host country risk factors and credit status
of multinationals.
The paper concludes that empirical evidence on tax sensitivity of
FDI  in  Mexico  is  quite  strong.  It  suggests  that  FDI  transfers  and
reinvested earnings respond negatively to the Mexican effective tax rate
and to regulations.  It is further dampened by the excess credit status of- iii  -
mulsinationals.  It is encouraged by  a favorable economic and political
climate  in Mexico,  as  indicated  by  the  country  credit  rating  of  The
Institutional Investor and by tariffs.
In view of the sensitivity of FDI to tax regime in Mexico, Mexico
must  aim  for tax rates closer  to but not  lower than the U.S. rates  to
eliminate any tax induced disincentives for investment as well as to ward
off  against  any  possible  transfer  of  revenue  from Mexico  to  the U.S.
Treasury  through  the  operation  of  U.S.  foreign  tax  credit provisions.
Mexico has already implemented tax reforms which make the tax regime there
competitive with  the USA and Canada.  Furthermore, effective taxation of
reinvestments  in Mexico  is  lower  tinv  a that  of  repatriations  providing
incentives  for  retained  earnings  The  new  2-percent  assets  tax,
nevertheless, because  of  its partial  non-creditability against  U.S.  tax
liability, may be a cause for concern by a potential investor.  This tax
could be replaced by an alternative minimum tax on an adjusted base that
would include tax preferences as part of taxable income.  Such a tax could
achieve the same purpose as the 2-percent assets tax but would  likely be
fully creditable against U.S. tax liabilities.
With the tax changes introduced in 1989, the Mexican tax system
does not provide any special disincentives for  foreign  investment.  In  view
of  this,  perhaps  public  policy  attention  needs  now  to be  focussed  on
accelerating  the  process  of  deregulation  of  FDI  already  initiated  in
Mexico.
An important implication of the conclusions reached here for other
developing  countries,  especially  for  those  where  the  degree  of  FDI
penetration is lsrge, is that they need not worry about providing special
tax incentives for foreign investment  but must insure that their tax system
is  competitive  with  the  home  tax  regime of  a marginal  investor having
access to foreign tax credits against domestic tax iiabilities.TAX SENSITIVITY  OF  '9REIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT
AN  EIIPIRILAL  ASSESSMENT
Anwar Shah and Joel Slemrod *
1.  Introduction
The  1980s  have  seen  a  remarkable  growth  in  foreign  direct
investment (FDI).  Along with this growth h&s come a renewed interest in
its effect on economic performance (of both the host and home country) and
on what is appropriate government policy toward FDI.  Not surprisingly, a
critical input to this debate is the responsiveness of FDI to attempts to
tax the income that it produces.  If FDI is not responsive to taxation,
then it may be an appropriate target of taxation by the host country, which
can raise revenue  without sacrificing a-ny  of the economic benefits that FDI
produces.  For some countries where the degree of FDI penetration is large,
the revenue raised from taxing FDI can represent a significant fraction of
total  tax  revenues. For  example  in Trinidad  and Tobago, Nigeria,  Pelk.,
Indonesia, Ecuador, and Egypt, tax payments by U.S. corporations alone aG a
share of host  country revenues exceed  10% (Alworth, 1988, p. 33).  If,
however, the volume of FDI responds negatively to taxation, then the host
country must  trade off the revenue gains  (if any) of increased taxation
against the eccno:ic costs of discouraging  FDI.
Most of the recent empirical literature on the tax sensitivity of
FDI has focused on investment to and from the United States.  Undoubtedly
*  This paper is the second in a series of papers commissioned by the Tax
Incentives  tor  Industrial  and  Technological  Development  Research
Project of the Public Economics Division.  An earlier version of this
paper was  presented  at  the World Bank  Conference on Tax Policy  in
Developing  Countries  in  March  1990.  We  are  grateful  to  Javad
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, Bela Balassa, Richard Musgrave, Charles McLure,
Harry Grubert, and Richard Bird for comments.- 2 -
this is due to the ready availAbility of  data regarding these flows.  In
this paper we  apply  and extend the standard methodology to a study of the
effect of taxation on FDI in Mexico.  We conclude that FDI in Mexico  is
sensitive to the tax regime in Mexico and of the investing countries.  In
addition  to taxation, the  regulatory framework and  overall economic and
political  climate  in  the  country  exercise  important  influences on  FDI
transfers and reinvestments in Mexico.
To  arrive at  these conclusions, the paper proceeds as  follows.
Section 2 reviews the recent empirical literature on FDI in the U.S., and
Section 3 draws out the important differences between Mexico and the U.S.
that  are  relevant for  an empirical study.  Sector  4 describes  the tax
regime for foreign investment in Mexico.  Based on these insights, Section
5  p-esents an empirical framework.  Section 6 outlines the data issues.
Section  7  reviews  the  empirical  results,  and  Section  8  offers  some
concluding comments.
2.  Review of the Existing Empirical Literature
The  recent  empirical  literatu:e on  the effects of  taxation  on
inward  foreign direct  investment has  focused exclusively on  FDI  in  the
United States.  Interest in this topic has been stimulated of late 1by  the
extraordinary increase in the  late 1980s of FDI  into the U.S.  Slemrod
(1989) discusses to what  extent tha; increase may be related to the tax
changes in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  Because of the literature's focus
on  FDI  into  the  U.S.,  below  we  first  review  this  literature  and
subsequently  we  discuss  how  an  empirical  treatment of  FDI  into Mexico
should be altered.Empirical study of the effect of taxation on the time series of
FDI in the U.S. was pioneered by Hartman (1984).  Using annual data from
1965 to 1979, he estimated the response of FDI, sepa-ately for investment
financed  by  retained  earnings  and  transfers  from  abroad,  to  three
variables:  the after-tax rate of return realized by foreign investors in
the U.S., the overall after-tax rate of return on capital in the U.S., and
the tax rate on U.S. capital owned by foreigners relative to the tax rate
on U.S. capital owned by U.S. investors.  The first two terms are meant to
proxy  for the prospective return  to new FDI,  the first term being more
appropriate for firms considering expansion of current operations and the
second more spplicable to the acquisition of existing assets  which are not
expected  to  earn  extraordinary  returns  based  on  production  of
differentiated products or possession of superior technology.  The relative
tax  term  is designed  to capture the possibility  that tax changes which
apply only to U.S.  investors will, by affecting the valuation of assets,
alter the foreign investor's cost and therefore the return to acquiring the
asset.1
Hartman  does  not  attempt  to  measure  either  an  effective
withholding  tax  rate  or  the  foreign  income  tax  rate  applied  to  the
aggregate of foreign direct investment.  He defends their absence by noting
the likelihood that the average values of these tax rates are relatively
constant  over  time.  Furthermore,  no  attempt  is made  to  measure  the
alternative rate of return available abroad to foreign investors.
Hartman's regression results reveal a positive association of both
after-tax  rate  of  return  variables  with  the ratio  to U.S.  GNP  of FDI
financed by retained earnings, and a negative association of the FDI-GNP
ratio  with  the  relative  tax  rate  on  foreigners  compared  to  domestic-4-
residents.  The model does not explain  transfers  from abroad  as well as
retained  earnings,  although  coefficients  of all three  variables  have the
expected  sign  and  are  significantly  different  from  zero. Hartman  concludes
from this research  that the effect  of taxes  on FDI, both that implied  by
reinvestment  of earnings  and that accomplished  by explicit  transfer  of
funds,  is  quite  strong.
Boskin  and Gale (1986)  re-estimate  Hartman's  equation  using the
updated  tax rate  and rate of return  series  from  Feldstein  and Jun (1986).
Although the estimated  elasticities  of FDI to the rates of return are
somewhat lower, none of the point estimates changes by more than one
standard  deviation.  They also extend  the sample  forward  to 1984,  and in
some cases  backward  to 1956,  and experiment  with a variety  of alternative
explanatory  variables  and functional  forms.  They conclude  that although
the results  are somewhat  sensitive  to sample  period  and  specification,  the
qualitative  conclusions  of Hartman  are  fairly  robust.
Young (1988)  uses revised  data on investment,  GNP and rates  of
return  earned  by foreigners  to estimate  similar  equations. These  changes
increase  the estimated  elasticities  with respecL to the rate of return
realized by foreigners  and the re!.¾  ive rate of return.  However,  the
equations for new transfers  of funds estimated  using the years 1956-84
yield  very poor results,  suggesting  tc Young  that  the simple  hartman  model
is  inadequate  for  studying  foreign  direct  investment  through  new  funds  when
applied  tc the  expanded  sample  period. Relaxing  Hartman's  assumption  of a
unitary  income  elasticity  and including  the lagged  dependent  vatiable  as a
right-hand  side  variable  does  not substantially  alter  the conclusions  for
retained  earnings  (although  the estimated  responsiveness  is significantly
lower),  but the tax responsiveness  of transfer  of new funds  still  is not
supported.Newlon (1987) reexamines the resuits of Hartman as well as Boskin
and Gale.  During his attempt at replication,  he discovered that the series
measuring  the  rate of  return on  foreign direc-  investment, used  in all
earlier papers, had been miscalculated from the original Bureau of Econoi,ic
Analysis data for the years 1965 to 1973.  Using the corrected series the
equation explaining retained earnings does not fit as well, although the
equation  explaining  transfers  fits  better.  In  explaining  retained
earnings, the  estimated co-efficients on the  return to FDI and  the  tax
ratio  are  slightly  larger  in  absolute  value  and  remain  statistically
significant, although the estimated coeffi.ient on the net return in the
U.S. Is lower and is no longer statistically significant.  For transfers of
funds, the estimated coefficient on the return to FDI is much larger and
becomes significant, although the estimated coefficient on the net return
in the U.S. becomes smaller and insignificant.  When the sample period is
extended to  range  from  1956 to  1984, Newlon's results also differ  from
those of Hartman and those of Boskin and Gale.  In particular, the equation
explaining transfer of funds fits poorly, and no estimated coefficient is
significant.2
It is notable  that none of these studies has deviated very  far
from the approach taken in Hartman's  1984 paper.  Although Young  (1988)
refers to Feldstein's  (1982) dictum that, in < i  absence of a perfectly
specified  model,  many  alternative  models  should  be  investigated,  the
empirical research has been extremely one-tracked.  This is a sufficient
reason  to  explore  alternative  methodologies.  Furthermore,  there  are
several problems with the standard approach  which bear further study.
In the previous literature, the disincentive to investment caused
by the tax system is implicitly measured by an average tax rate, computedas  total  taxes  paid  divided  by  a  measure  of  profits.  However,  the
incentive to undertake new investment depends on the effective marginal tax
rate which, as is  well known, can deviate substantially from an average tax
rate concept.
None of  the existing studies attempts to estimate the effect of
the home country's tax system on FDI in the U.S.  Of course, collecting the
appropriate data is difficult and perhaps, as Hartman argued, these tax
rates  have  not  in  fact varied  much.  The  observed  stability,  though,
applies to stAtutory tax rates and not necessarily to the more appropriate
effective marginal tax rates.  There is also a theoretical reason to focus
attention on the host country tax rate.  riartman  (1:'85)  has argued that
only  the  host  country's  tax  system  matters  for  investment coming from
subsid 4.aries'  earnings, even when the home country taxes its residents on
-ie basis of worldwide  income.  This  is because the home country's tax
equally reduces the parent's return to an inrestment and the opportunity
cost of making an investment (remitting  a dividend to the parent).3 Thus,
for any subsidiary whose desired investment exceeds earnings, the tax due
upon reDatriation of earnings does .natter.  This situation would  likely
occur tor newly formed subsidiaries.  In any event, it is worthwhile to
investigate  empirically  the  impact  of both  the home  country's  rate of
taxation and its system of taxing foreign-source income.
The  interpretation of  the estimated coefficient on  the  rate  if
return to FDI variable is also problematic, as stressed by Newlon.  This
rate of return is defined as the after-tax income from direct investment
divided by the stock of direct  investment.  When the home country has a
foreign tax credit  with deferral, it is often optimal for the subsidiary to
finance investment by first using retained earnings, and only when theseearnings are exhausted to  se funds transferred from the parent firm.  This
hierarchy  of  financing  implies  that whenever  a  subsidiary's investment
exceeds its retained earnings, its retained earnings will exactly equal its
income.  Thus for these firms  we would expect a direct association between
the calculated rate of return (in  which after-tax income is the numerator)
on FDI and retained earnings, regardless of whether  the average rate of
return in fact influences decisions concerning new FDI.  As Newlon notes,
if subsidiaries  were following a fixed dividend pay out rule (e.g., it pays
out a fixed fraction of income), a direct association between income and
retained earnings would also be observed.  This argument  may also apply to
subsidiaries of firms residing in countries that employ territorial systems
of taxation, thus rendering problematic any observed empirical association
between FDI out of retained earnings and realized rate of return.
Slemrod  (in Razin  and Slemrod,  forthcoming) attempts  to remedy
some of the empirical problems discussed above.  He extends and updates a
Hartman-style  model  of  aggregate FDI  ir  the U.S.,  in part  replacing a
measure of the average rate of tax by a measure of the marginal effective
tax rate on new  investment.  This  analysis is generally supportive of a
negative impact of U.S. effective rates of taxation on total FDI and new
transfers of funds, but not on retained earnings.
3.  Unique Problems and Advantages of Studying FDI in Mexico
An  analysis  of  FDI  to Mexico  poses  some unique  problems but
offers some unique analytical advantages.  Here we review each in turn.-8-
3.1  Unique Problems
Historically,  policy  emphasis  in  Mexico  has  been  on  the
"regulation" of foreign investment rather than encouragement or promotion
of  such  investment.  Foreign  investment was  viewed  as  a  vehicle  for
political and economic domination of Mexico and therefore suspect.  The
period  from  1948  to  1982 witnessed  a  trend towards a more  restrictive
policy  regime  towards  foreign  investment.  First,  certain  important
industries such  as telecommunications, electric power,  timber, and  film
distribution  were  nationalized.  Second,  foreign  investment  in  most
industries  was  restricted  to minority  participation  subject  to  prior
authorization from the Government of Mexico.  The regulatory environment
worked to discourage foreign participation and as a result  the net FDI
flows  averaged  less  than  one  percent  of  GDP  during  1950  to  1985.  A
dramatic reversal of these past policies has been taking place in recent
years.  This began with  the  initiation of  a debt  to equity  conversion
scheme  (the scheme was  later suspended in 1987 and reinstated again  in
1990) and the exemption of small to medium levels of investment from the
prior authorization for majority participation in 1986.  In 1987, majority
FDI participation  in  specified sectors was  permitted on  a case  by case
basis.  On May  19, 1989 President Carlos Salinas De Gortari announced a
major shift in Mexican policy towards foreign investment.  He stated:
"We are  a mature  country with  the  judicial,  intellectual  and
economic  capacity  to  assimilate  the  largest  flow  of  foreign
investment.  On  behalf of  all Mexicans, we  will  institute new
regulations  to  encourage  the  types of  foreign  investment that
support our economic policy  objectives without  compromising our
sovereignty  and  freedom of action".  (Press Release,  Monterey,
N.L.).-9-
This presidential pronouncement was  followed by major changes in
the  foreign  investment regulations.  The new  regulations establish that
majority investment in non-restricted sectors meeting all of the following
six criteria would be eligible to receive automatic approval:
1.  that the investment is less than 250 billion pesos (about 100
million U.S. dollars);
2.  that the capital originates from outside Mexico;
3.  that the project be located outside the country's three major
industrial cities (Mexico  City, Monterrey and Guadalajara);
4.  that the foreign exchange cost is spread evenly over a period
of three years;
5.  that the investment  provides permanent jobs and training; and
6.  that  the  project  uses  "adequate" technologies  that satisfy
existing environmental regulations.
The regulations further permit limited access to the Mexican stock market
through special trust funds.  Temporary access to some  sectors normally
reserved  for  Mexicans  only will  be  allowed  under  20-year  trusts  for
investment in Mexican companies with high export potential or in financial
distress.  30-year trust funds will provide access to otherwise restricted
geographical  zones  such  as  coastal  and border  areas.  New  regulations
stipulate  automatic  approval  of  an  application  on which  the  National
Foreign Investment Commission fails to reach a decision within 45 days of
the initial submission.
It is clear from the above discussion that whatever the demand for
FDI  in Mexico,  in most  of  the post-war  years  the  supply of  available
opportunities for FDI has been limited by regulations.  Thus  it will be
important  to  control  for  this  in  the  analysis.  If  demand was  always
limited  by  these  regulations  in  a  binding  way,  there  would  be  no- 10  _
interesting story to tell about taxation.  However, we believe that these
limitations were not always binding, so that tax influences on demand did
play a role in the volume of FDI into Mexico.
The  instability  of  the Mexican  economy  also  poses  analytical
problems.  The high inflation rates  (114% in 1987) and nominal interest
rates (92% in 1987) have dramatic consequences for the calculations of the
effective tax rate on new  investment.  The  standard assumptions used  in
their calculation, that current values for inflation, interest rates, tax
rates, and tax depreciation rates will persist in the future, are unlikely
to be accurate, but reasonable alternative assumptions about expectations
are not obvious.  This problem suggests that some measure of the average
rate of taxation (taxes paid divided by a measure of economic income) may
be  a more  accurate  measure  of  the  tax  system's  disincentives  than an
analytically constructed  marginal tax rate.
3.2  Unique Advantages
Historically a malority of FDI in Mexico originates in the United
States.  This fact offers two analytical advantages.  First, because the
U.S. independently compiles country-by-country data on outward FDI, it is
pcssible to check the Mexican data on inward FDI from the U.S. against the
U.S.  data  on  outward  FDI  to  Mexico.  Second,  it  facilitates  the
investigation of the effect of the investing country's tax system on FDI.
4.  Taxation of Foreign Investment Income in  Mexico
Mexico  taxes  non-residents  under  the  territorial  rule  and
therefore only income originating from Mexican sources is taxed.  Mexico is- 11 -
a member of the Latin America Integration  Association which aims to provide
preferential  treatment  to  member  countries  in matters  of  trade  and
taxation.  Mexico  has  not  yet  concluded  any  comprehensive  treaty  on
avoidance of double taxation or tax sparing  with any other country.  It has
concluded agreements with the USA, Canada and Netherlands on the avoidance
of  double  taxation  of  income  from  international  shipping  and/or  air
transport and  with France on prevention and investigation  of customs fraud.
In Mexico,  until  1989, dividends  of a  foreign  subsidiary were
exempt from the corporate tax base but taxed upon distribution to a parent.
All  income of a branch was  taxed upon  accrual; thus from a Mexican tax
standpoint, establishing a subsidiary rather than a branch office  was a tax
preferred alternative.  (Home country tax rules also generally favor the
subsidiary  form,  because  tax  liability  is  deferred  until  earnings are
repatriated).  As a result of various tax changes introduced in 1989, the
differential treatment by Mexico of subsidiary income over branch income
was  eliminated.  Major  features  of  the  taxation of  foreign  investment
income announced in 1989 are summarized in the following  parigraphs.
Taxation  of  Corporate  Income:  The  corporate  income  tax  base  is  now
completely  indexed.  Taxable  profits  (defined  as  gross receipts minus
costs, business expenses, dividends corresponding to previous periods of
earnings and net losses carried forward from other periods) are subject to
tax at a rate of 35%.  Full expensing of investment is permitted in all
regions except major metropolitan areas (permitted rate is 60% in the first
year  and  remaining  40%  subject  to  capita'  consumption  allowances  in
excepted cases) and in all sectors except the automobiles.  Note that major
metropolitan  areas  in Mexico  account  for  nearly  two-third  of  total
investment.- 12 -
Assets Tax:  An assets tax at a rate of 2% of the average value of total
assets  of  business  enterprises  and creditable against  their  income tax
liability in Mexico, is levied effective in 1989.
Dividend Income:  Starting in 1989, dividends will no longer be deductible
by the corporation distributing them nor includable in the gross income of
the recipient.  The withholding tax on dividend distributions varies with
the source  (whether or not paid  from accumulated earnings already taxed
("the net tax profit account") or paid from untaxed other sources) and the
tax regime faced by the recipient as follows:
Dividends Paid From
Recipient  the "net tax  Other
profit account"  Sources
Individuals or non-profit organizations,
resident or non-resident in Mexico  10%  40Z
Resident Corporations  None  35%
Foreign Corporations:
1.  home tax rate on foreign dividend
income at 30% or more  None  35%
2.  home tax rate on foreign dividend
income at less then 30%  10%  40%
Interest Income and Royalties:  The withholding tax rate on interest income
and  payments  for technical assistance, know-how, transfer of  technology
fees including royalties for patents when licensed in connaction with  the
rendering of technical assistance paid  to non-residents will  be 35%  and
21%,  respectively,  beginning  in  1991.  Payments  for  the use  of  other
royalties  such as  for  the licensing of  trade marks  or trade  names, or- 13 -
patents without the rendering of technical assistance  will be taxed at 40%.
Goods in Bonded Warehouses:  These goods are subject to a 3% tax either on
the value on which import duties is assessed or declared  value whichever is
greater.
Profit Sharin  :  All businesses in  Mexico are obliged to share 10% of their
)rofits  with employees.
Social Security and Payroll Taxes:  Employers are obliged to contribute to
social  security  coverage  for workers  (11%  of workers'  weekly  wages),
cnildren's nurseries (1% of wages) and an occupational risk fund (from 5 to
167% of wages  with  167% being applicable in certain high risk  resource
industries).  In addition, employers contribute 5% of wages to the National
Housing Fund and 1% of wages in support of education.
Value-Added Tax  (VAT):  The general 15% rate of the VAT is applicable to
all transactions rendered in the border and free zones.
Investment  Incentives:  Effective  1991  immediate  full  expensing  of
investment will be available to all investors regardless of the resident
status.  Incentives  for  priority  industries  and  special  regions  are
available  to Mexican  residents  only.  The  "inbond-assembly" industries
established  in  border  areas  may  be  completely  owned  and  operated  by
foreigners  provided  Mexicans  are  hired  to  process  the  imported  raw
materials  using  imported equipment and the processed goods are  exported
back to the country of origin.
Table I provides a comparative perspective on taxation of business income
in Mexico and the major source countries for foreign investment.  It shows
that the Mexican  tax system is fully competitive with  the tax regime  in
home countries of foreign investors.  Mexico has also moved some distance
towards adoption of a full cash flow taxation in a future year.  The table- 14 -
Table 1
Taxation of Business Income:  A Comparative Perspective
Mexico (1991)  U.S.A. (1990)  Canada (1990)
Corporate Income Tax
Rate: General  35+100x35-38.9  34+6-40  28+15=43
90
Withholding Taxes: Rates
Interest  35  30  28
Dividends  35/0  30  25
Technology Transfer fees  21  30  25
Royalties  40  30  25
Indexation of deductions  Full  No  No
Loss carry forward  5  15  7
Loss carry backward  0  3  3
Minimum/Alternative  2% Assets tax  20% on taxable  0.175% on capital
Minimum Tax  income inclus-  in  excess of  S10
ive of tax pre- million creditable




Coverage  Full  Full  2/3rd
Indexation  Full  No  No
Rate  35  34  28
Dividends deduction  No  Yes  Yes
Full Expensing of Investment  Yes  No  No
Investment Tax Credits  Regional &  Energy Invest-  Regional
Priority  ment, Rehab-  & R & D




Source:  Ugarte  (1988);  Price  Waterhouse  (1988, 1989); Mancera  Hermanos
(1989); International Bureau of  Fiscal Documentation  (1988) and
Gil-Diaz (1989).- 15 -
shows that possibly the only cause of concern for a foreign investor  may be
the 22 assets tax which would not be creditable against U.S. or Canadian
tax liability.
5.  Some Theory and the Empirical Model
5.1  Some Theory
The modern  literature has, for the most part, concluded that the
demand for FDI is primarily an issue of industrial organization.  Dunning
(1985, p. 6-7) has argued that FDI by firms of country A  in country B is
more likely if  A's firms (i)  possess ownership-specific  advantages relative
to B's  firms in  sourcing markets,  (ii) find it profitable to use  these
advantages themselves rather than lease them to B's firms, and (iii) find
it profitable to utilize their ownership-specific advantages in B rather
than A.  A large body of empirical literature  has been addressed to testing
this  theory  of  international  production,  usually  referred  to  as  the
"eclectic"  theory.  Much  of  this  research  has  been  cross-sectional,
relating  the  extent  of  foreign  investment  in  a  given  sector  to
characteristics  of  that  sector  that  represent  ownership-specific  and
location specific comparativr advantages.  Several examples of this type of
analysis are contained in Dunning (1985).
Studies of the effects of taxation on FDI have generally taken the
perspective that whatever its benefits to firms are? they must be balanced
against the tax consequences of carrying out FDI.  We may hypothesize that
the tax systems of both Mexico and the firm's home country can affect the
incentives concerning FDI  as well  as how  to finance a given pattern of
FDI.4- 16 -
Mexico, as do all countries of the  world, asserts the right to tax
the income originating within its borders, including the income generated
by multinationals.  The  effective tax rate on this income depends in a
complicated way on the statutory tax rate on corporate income, the extent
of tax credits granted, and the definition of the tax base, including the
system of depreciation and how gross income and deductions are allocated
between  Mexican-source and foreign-source.
There are two approaches to measuring the effective tax rate on
new  investment.  In  the  analytical  approach  pioneered  by  Hall  and
Jorgenson,  one  calculates  the  level  of  pre-tax  rsturn  required  for a
stylized investment to yield a given return after tax.  The wedge between
the pre-tax rate of return and the after-tax rate is a measure of the tax-
related disincentive to invest.  This procedure requires details on the tax
code, rate of inflation, economic depreciation rates, proportion of debt
and  equity  finance,  and  costs  of  debt  and  equity  finance.  Thus  the
effective tax  rate on  equi  transfers and retained earnings on  FDI in
Mexico would be different.
The alternative approach is to calculate the ratio of taxes paid
in  a  given  year  by  a  measure  of  income  that  is  independent  of  the
definition  of  taxable  income.  This  approach  may  capture  lome of  the
features of the tax law which are left out of the analytical approach, and
also may more  accurately capture some features which are present in the
analytical  models  but  are  inadequately  represented  by  the  stylized
assumptions that must be made  to calculate marginal effective tax rates.
As we  argued above,  because of the  extreme volatility  of the  inflation
rate, from 2 to 132% on annual basis, in  the Mexican case an  average tax
rate  may be mcre appropriate.- 17 -
The country of residence of the multinational may also assert the
right to tax the income that is generated in  Mexico.  This is not, however,
true of all countries.  Some countries, notably France and Netherlands,
operate  a  "territorial"  system  for  active  (i.e., non-portfolio)  income
earned abroad.  Under a territorial system, the home country levies no tax
of its own on the foreign-source income.  Under the "worldwide" system of
taxation,  used  by  the United  States, Canada, United Kingdom,  and Japan
among other countries, the multinational's home country asserts the right
to tax its income regardless of where it is generated.  In order to avoid
two tiers of taxation, these countries offer their multinationals a limited
credit against domestic tax liability for certain taxes paid  to foreign
governments.  'he credit is generally limited to what  tax liability the
foreign-source income would  incur if home country tax rules were applied.
Finally,  in  most  cases  the  tax  liability  (and  credit)  attendant  to
subsidiaries' foreign-source is deferred until dividends are repatriated to
the parent company.  Foreign-source income of branch operations is not,
however, deferred but instead is taxable upon accrual.
Let Tm be the effective rate of tax on new investment imposed by
the  Mexican  tax  system.  For  a multinational  from a  country using  the
territorial  system,  Tm  is also  the  total  tax burden  imposed.  For  a
multinational from a country with a worldwide system of taxation, there is
another level of taxation to consider, that of the home country.  The "old"
view of this extra level of taxation is given by max(a(tu-rm),O) where tu
is the tax rate of the home country and a  is a value between zero and one
that  reflects the benefits of being able to  defer the tax liability on
subsidiaries' foreign-source income until the earnings are repatriated.  In
the cases where  earnings are never repatriated (a is equal to zero), or- i8 -
when the firm is in an excess credit position (rm>tu),  the home country tax
is irrelevant.  An opposite extreme case occurs when a is equal to one,
implying that the host country tax liability of the multinational can be
fully offset by the home country tax credits.  Note that tu is generally
closer  to  a  statutory  rate  concept  than  an  effective  tax  rate  on
investment,  since  the  home  country  tax  base  for  foreign-source  income
generally does not take account of such things as accelerated depreciation
and investment tax credits that affect the taxable income due to domestic
operations.  Note that ao(tu-rm) can be negative if tu is less than rm.  In
this case tax paid to the host country generates foreign tax credits that
may be used to offset the tax that could otherwise be due on repatriations
from low-tax country whose effective tax rate is less than tu.
The "new" view  of the total tax burden on FDI, due to Hartman
(1984), holds that if investment is financed by retained earnings of the
foreign subsidiary, then the home country tax rate is irrelevant, so that
the total tax burden remains at rm.  The reasoning is that any taxes due
upon repatriation to the home country reduce equally the opportunity cost
of  investment  (a repatriated  dividend)  and  the  after-tax  return  to
investment.  Thus it  is irrelevant for the incentive to invest.  Even under
the new view, however, the home country tax rate would be relevant for home
country  multinationals  that are  contemplating a  transfer of  funds  to a
foreign subsidiary.  It is difficult to reconcile, though, the simultaneous
occurrence  of  transfers  of  funds  and  remittance  of  dividends  from
subsidiaries, since these activities incur an avoidable tax liability (see
Hines and Hubbard, forthcoming).
Thus under the "new"  view, the total tax burden on FDI financed by
retained  earnings  is rm but  is  rm+a (tu-rm) for investment  financed by- 19  -
transfer  of  funds.  The  old  view  did  not  distinguish debt  and equity
financing, using the latter expression for  both cases.
The value of a  will depend on the excess credit or limit position
of ehe potential  investor.  If the multinational is in an excess credit
position,  so  that  the  average  rate of  tax paid  to  foreign governments
exceeds  tu,  then at  the margin  there  is no  extra  tax due  to  the home
country government upon repatriation.  If the multinational is in an excess
limit position, where the average rate of foreign taxes paid is less than
tu, then the repatriation tax may be binding at the margin.  Note that this
depends on the average rate of tax paid to all foreign governments, not
just Mexico.  Thus even if rm is less than tu, if the overall foreign tax
rate exceeds tu, then the Mexican tax rate is the marginal rate (a is close
to zero).
A  recent paper by Scholes and Wolfson  (1989) has suggested that
the  ownership  of  a  given stock  of domestic capital will  depend  on  the
relative tax rate paid by alternative owners.  This implies that, in the
contest  for  ownership  of Mexican  capital,  foreign owners will  be more
likely to be successful the lower is the ratio (rm+ao(tu-rm)]/rm.  (This  of
course  only applies  if the horne  country operates a worldwide  system  of
taxation).  The surprising implication of this analysis is that, as long as
a  is greater than zero and tu exceeds rm, an increase in rm will increase
foreign ownership of Mexican capital.  The idea is that while an increase
in rm applies fully to potential Mexican owners (or owners from countries
with  a  territorial tax  system), its effect on  foreign owners  is partly
offset by credits taken against domestic tax liability.  Thus it reduces
the relative tax burden on foreign owners from countries with worldwide tax
systems.  Of  course,  to  the  extent  that  rm reduces  the  incentive  to- 20  -
undertake  investment  in  Mexico,  both  domestically  and  foreign-owned
investment will  decline.  The overall impact on FDI thus depends on the
relative stre:.gth  of the Scholes-Wolfson ownership effc!ct  and the volurme
effect.  Furthermore, the ownership effect applies only to investment from
countries with  a worldwide  tax  system and only  to the  extent  that the
multinationals  are in  an excess  limitation position, so that additional
taxes paid to the Mexican government do in  fact generate additional foreign
tax credits.
5.2  The Em itical  Model
The foregoing discussion suggests that a general empirical model
of the impact of taxation on FDI in Mexico have the following form:
(1)  FDIs - fs (rm;L(tu-rm),X)
whare X is a vector of non-tax factors that affect FDI and L is an index of
the credit status of the investing countries.  The presumption is that the
greater the extent of excess credit status, the lower the effect of the
home country's tax rate.  The subscript s on FDI suggests that the impact
of taxes may depend on the source of financing.
In order to see the implications  of the competing theories of FDI,
we specify (1) as follows:
(2a)  FDIT - (,o  +  alrm +  a2 (tu-m)  +  a3-L-(tu-rm) +  a4X +  uT
(2b)  FDIR - bo +  blTm +  b2 (tu-7m)  +  b3 L (tu-rm)  +  b4 X +  uR
where  a  subscript  T  denotes  FDI  financed  by  transfers of  funds and  a
subscript R denotes FDI financed  by retained earnings.- 21 -
6.  The Data
Aggregate  data  on  stocks  and  flows  of  FDI  and other  relevant
variables for the period 1965-1985 have been assembled from a variety of
sources.  Details of these sources are given in an appendix.  A few key
variables utilized in the study are described in the following paragraphs.
Foreign Direct Investment:  Data on FDI flows is derived from the Banco de
Mexico's published and unpublished sources for various years.  Substantial
details on the financial flows of firms with foreign capital are available
from  these  sources,  including  transfers  and  reinvested  earnings.  A
breakdown  of FDI  by  economic sector and  the country  of origin  is  also
available.  Alternate but  less complete sources of FDI data include the
U.S. Commerce Department (U.S. investments only) and the Director General
of Foreign Investment (new  approvals only). Figure 1 shows FDI from 1965 to
1987.  It indicates that from 1965 to 1977, FDI showed a slow but steadily
rising trend.  The beginning of the oil boom in the late seventies led to
dramatic increases in FDI reaching 1981 peak of U.S. $2.0 billion.  Later,
the end of the oil  boom  in  1981 coincided with a sharp curtailment of FDI.
This trend was reversed again in 1984 and accelerated with the initiation
of debt/equity conversion schemes and  the exemption of  small/medium FDI
from government control and approval process.  The debt/equity conversion
scheme was subsequently suspended in 1987 and a process to relax foreign
investment regulations  was initiated the same year and for the first time,
majority foreign participation in key sectors was permitted on a case by
case basis.  This decontrol process was  further strengthened by  the new
foreign investment regulations unveiled in 1989.Figure  I
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Figure 2 provides details on net transfer6 to Mexico during the
period 1965 to 1987.  These transfers show a fairly flat trend during 1965
to 1977, alternating boom and bust cycles from 1978 to 1982 and a sharply
rising  trend  since  1983.  Figure  3  graphs  retained  earnings  by
multinationals  in  Mexico  during  the  period  1965  to  1987.  These
reinvestments show a slightly rising trend from 1967 to 1975, declining
trend during 1975 to 1977 and  major alternating  boom and bust cycles in the
next decade coinciding with cycles in general economic activity.
Effective Tax Rates:  Four alternate measures of the tax disincentive to
new  investment  in  Mexico,  three  marginal  (one  each  for  aggregate
investment,  transfers  and  r:etained  earnings) and  the fourth an  average
measure,  are developed  in  this paper.  First, historical series on  the
marginal effective tax rate on new aggregate investment in Mexico (rm) is
developed  using  the  standard  Auerbach-Hill-Jorgenson  methodology  (see
Appendix A).  A comparable series for the U.S. is obtained from Auerbach-
Hines (1988).  Then we develop marginal effective tax rate for transfers by
calculating weighted  average cost of capital by taking into account such
factors as Mexican and U.S. corporate tax rate, U.S. personal tax rate,
U.S.  interest  rate,  U.S.  and  Mexican  inflation  rate,  and the  rate of
Mexican  pesos  depreciation against  the dollar  (see Auerbach,  1990).  A
third  marginal  effective  tax  rate  calculation  was  done  for  retained
earnings.  Finally,  an average effective tax rate  (T) measure  based on
corporate tax liability per dollar of value added is calculated for both
Mexico (Tm) and the USA (Tu).  The choice of this particular formulation of
the average effective tax rate was based primarily on the completeness of
data  series  for  this measure.  Several  alternate  measures  of  average
effactive tax rates are also available.  These include average effectiveFigure  2
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rate on gross profits, revenues and assets.  While complete data series for
these variables are available for the U.S., for Mexico  observations are
missing for all years beyond 1981.  For this reason, these series were not
used  in  further  analyses.  The marginal  effective tax  rate measure  is
conceptually  attractive  but  as  discussed  in  Section  3.1,  a  highly
inflationary environment with  financing constraints clouds the usefulness
of  such  a measure.  Therefore,  the  paper  also  explores  the  average
effective  tax  rate  as  an  alternate  measure  of  the  tax  system's
disincentive.
Index of Credit  Status of  Investing Multinationals  (L):  This  index is
calculated  as  the  ratio  of  foreign  tax  credit  claimed  to  foreign  tax
credits  available  to U.S. multinationals.  Because U.S.  investment has
accounted for about two-third of Mexican FDI in this period studied, it is
a reasonable indicator of the excess credit status of investing countries
generally.  The  closer  this  index is  to zero, the more  likely is the
typical J.S. multinational  to be  in an excess credit position.  At  the
extreme where  this value  is  one, all available foreign tax credits are
immediately  claimed,  implying that the multinationals are  in  an excess
limitation  (deficit  of  credit)  position.  A  major  limitation  of  this
measure  is that data were  available only for five years; values  for the
remaining years were interpolated.  Longer time series data is available on
an alternate but conceptually less satisfactory measure  i.e., the credit
status of  U.S. multinationals investing worldwide  (LW).  This  alternate
measure  include all U.S. multinationals, whether  investing in Mexico  or
not.  Because of the presence of some firms with no Mexican investment in
this  sample,  use  of  this  latter measure  in the  analyses of  reinvested
earnings  would be subject to caveats.- 27 -
Country Credit Rating (CRM): The Business International Corporation (BIC)
and  the  Institutional  Investor  (II)  publish  annual  credit  ratings  of
various countries based on a composite index of political, commercial and
monetary  factors  (see Appendix A  for details).  To develop a consistent
time series data on the credit rating of Mexico, the BIC index for 1965 to
1979 was spliced with the II index for 1979-1987.  This index is a useful
measure of the country risk factors.
Index of Regulations (REGU):  Black market exchange rate premia is used as
an  index  of  regulation  in  Mexico.  Exchange  rate  premia  in  Mexico
correlates well  to past history of  regulation and therefore serves as a
reasonable proxy of regulatory environment.  This is however, not a fully
satisfactory measure of regulations as it may simply be capturing effects
of import restrictions.
Effective  Tariff  Rate  (MDM):  Data  on  import duties and  the value  of
imports from various Mexican government publications are used to calculate
these historical series.
7.  Empirical Estimation and Results
A  wide  array  of  variables  to  empirically  implement  models
specified in Equations 2a and 2b is available.  Choices include alternate
measures  of  tax  disincentives  such  as  marginal  (r), average  (T) or
statutory (t)  tax rates, two alternate measures of excess credit status of
multinationals  and  a  host  of  non-tax  factors  including  quantitative
restrictions, unemployment rates in the host and home countries, exchange
rate and price movements etc.
Mexican data show a great deal of variability during the period
1977 to  1987 due to oil boom and bust cycles.  To examine differential- 28 -
behavior during this as opposed to earlier period in the sample, intercept
dummy with a value of one for the oil boom-bust period and zero otherwise
was used in various regressions.  This variable was found insignificant and
therefore  dropped  from  further  analysis.  Note  that  the  economic
environment associated with oil boom and bust cycles is well captured by
credit ratings and therefore it  is possible to isolate tax effects from the
effects  associated  with  a  general  deterioration and/or  amelioration of
economic activity.  Furthermore, marginal effective tax rate incorporates
rate of return to FDI and therefore captures variability of profits over
time.  The  foremost  dilemma  in model  estimation  was  presented by  the
choices available for the tax rate variable.  Theory did not provide much
guidance  in  this  respect  and  therefore  final  variable  selection  was
primarily done on the basis of model selection tests described below.  It
should  be  noted  that  in various  formulations  of  the models,  marginal
effective tax variable showed a great deal of consistency as a determinant
of transfers and retained earnings.  Estimated coefficients of average tax
rate and statutory tax rates variables, on the other hand, showed a great
deal  of  sensitivity  to  model  specification.  This  instability  of
coefficients was partly attributable to a degree of collinearity among a
subset of variables.  An unexplained part of this instability is that the
coefficient estimates for regressions  on retained earnings showed a greater
degree of instability than for those for transfers.  Thus the conclusions
reached  in  the  following  sections merely  represent our  best judgements
based on available data.  It is conceivable that a better set of data may
or may not support some of the conclusions reached here.
As  a  first  step  the Lagrange  multiplier test  is used  here  to
screen regressors to be  included in model  specification.  Subsequently,- 29 -
several  alternate  models  are  formulated  and model  selection tests  are
conducted  to  select  "the  best"  model.5 These tests  take  the  form of
residual sum of squares  multiplied by a penalty factor.  The penalty factor
varies directly with  the number of estimated parameters.  An increase in
model complexity would reduce residuals sum of squares (RSS) while raising
the penalty.  A better performing model thus would have  lower values on
most  of  these  tests  than  an  alternate  model.  Two  better  performing
regressions  based on these criteria are presented in Tables 2 and 3.6
Table  2  presents  estimation  results  for  FDI  transfers  from
1965-1987.  FDI transfers to Mexico show a great deal of sensitivity to
Mexican marginal effective tax rate (rm) and Mexico's credit ratings (CRM).
The estimated coefficient of rm suggests that a one percent increase in the
marginal effective tax rate on investment in Mexico induced a 6.2 percent
decrease in FDI transfers to Mexico (at mean values of variables).  As the
elasticity of marginal effective tax rate  with respect to Mexican statutory
tax rate is only 0.2, this translates into FDI elasticity of -1.24 only
with  respect  to  the  changes  in  Mexican  statutory  tax  rates.  Each
percentage  point  increase  in  the  credit  rating  also  induced  a  2.5
percentage increase in FDI transfers at mean values.  The tax differential
variable and the composite variable on credit status of multinationals had
signs consistent with a priori expectations,  but were not significant.  The
estimated  coefficient  of  the  tax  differential  variable  suggests  that
Mexican tax differentials over the U.S. statutory r.tes did not matter much
for FDI transfers to Mexico.  Furthermore, the excess credit position of
the multinationals had a small and insignificant effect on FDI transfers to
Mexico.  Empirical results further suggest that the regulatory environment
in Mexico discourages foreign investment and protective trade barriers had- 30  -
Table 2
Regression Explaining FDI Transfers to Mexico
(Equation  2A)
Period:  1965-1987
Dependent Variable:  FDIT
Independent Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic
rm  -6766.7  -2.4
tu-rm  -3994.5  -0.8
L(tu-rm)  -3012.1  -0.6
CRM  34.6  3.8
REGU  -394.6  -1.6
MDM  2507.9  1.1
CONSTANT  2341.1  1.7
R2  -0.89
Log of the Likelihood function =  -157.7
Model Selection Tests
Log AIC: 11.5
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a positive effect on FDI.  Overall, the specified equation fitted the data
well, explaining 89Z of the  variation in FDI.
Equation  2b  (see Table  3) indicates that reinvested earnings are
quite sensitive to the Mexican marginal effective tax rate, Mexican-U.S. tax
differentials,  the  credit position of  the multinationals, Mexico's  credit
ratings and regulations.  Protective trade barriers, on the other hand, did
not play  any significant t le in reinvestment decisions of multinationals.
Reinvested  earnings  showed  negative  but  elastic  responses to  changes  in
Mexican marginal effective tax rate (elasticity ,t  mean values of -2.8 with
respect to marginal effective tax rate but only -0.56 with respect to the
Mexican statutory tax rate) and Mexican-U.S. tax differences (elasticity at
mean values of -7.5).  A change in the credit status of multinationals toward
excess credit influenced positively their decisions to reinvest rather than
repatriate  earnings.  This  influence  is  estimated  to  be  quite  strong
(elasticity  at mean values of 4.3).
Overall,  the  results  confirm  the  "old"  view  regarding  the  tax
sensitivity of FDI and suggest that both the host and home tax regimes matter
for FDI in Mexico.  In addition to taxation, the regulatory framework and
overall  economic  and  political  climate  in the country were  the  dominant
influences  on FDI transfers and reinvestments in  Mexico.
8.  Policy Im2lications
Our  analysis  suggests  that  FDI  in Mexico  shows  a  great deal of
sensitivity to tax  regime in Mexico.  Thus Mexico must  aim for tax rates
closer to but not  lower than the U.S.  rates to eliminate any tax induced
disincentives for investment as  well as to  ward off against any possible- 32 -
Table 3
Reinvested Profits Eguation (2B)
Period:  1965-1987
Dependent Variables: FDIR
Independent Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic
Tm  -2593.'  -2.9
tu-Tm  -6687.5  -2.7
L * (tu-Tm)  5166.0  2.5
CRM  17.1  3.0
PEGU  -340.0  -1.9
MDM  -1573.9  -0.9
COl'STANT  3415.6  5.1
-2  - 0.69
Log of the Likelihood function - -146.9
Model Selection Tests
Log AIC: 10.5
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transfer of revenue from Mexico to the U.S. Treasury through the operation of
U.S.  foreign  tax  credit  provisions.  Mexico  has already  implemented tax
reforms which make the tax regime there competitive  with the USA and Canada.
Furthermore, effective taxation of reinvestments in Mexico is lower than that
of  repatriations providing  incentives for  retained earnings.  The new  2%
assets tax, nevertheless, because of its partial non-deductibility against
U.S. tax liability  may be a cause for concern by a potential investor.  This
tax could be  replaced by an alternative minimum tax with  an adjusted base
that would  include tax preferences as part of taxable income.  Such a tax
could achieve  the same functions as  the 2Z  assets tax but would be  fully
creditable against U.S. tax liabilities.
Since with  the  tax  changes  introduced  in  1989, the Mexican  tax
system does not  provide any special disincentives for foreign investment.
perhaps  public policy  attention needs  to be  focussed on accelerating  the
process of deregulation of FDI already initiated in  Mexico.
An important implication of the conclusions reached here for other
developing countries where the degree of FDI penetration is large, is that
they  need  not  worry  about  providing  special  tax  incentives  for  foreign
investment but must insure that their tax system is competitive  with the home
tax  regime  of  a marginal  investor  having  access  to  foreign tax  credits
against domestic tax liabilities.- 34 -
NOTES
1/  Hartman  argues  that  the variable  measuring  the  rate of  return  to
domestic capital, because it is based on replacement costs, will not
capture these valuation effects.
2/  Newlon  also  estimates  variants  of  Hartman's  original  model  with
several additional variables, including a quadratic time trend, dummy
variables  for the  years when  data  revisions were  made,  and with  a
definition of the return to direct investment that includes the fees
and royalties that accrue to the parent from its foreign subsidiary.
Most of these changes do not alter the qualitative results reported
earlier.
3/  If, however, the home country's tax system is expected to change, then
there is an incentive to time repatriations  appropriately.
4/  On credibility of Tax regime for FDI, see Bond and Samuelson (1989).
5/  Formulae for model selection tests as reported below:
Akaike Information  Criterion (AIC):  RSS/(N-k)
Schwarz Criterion (SC): (RSS/N)  Nk/N
Akaike Finite Prediction Error (FPE): (RSS/N) (N+k)/(N-k)
Hannan and Quinn Criterion (HQ): (RSS/N) (lnN)2k/N
Shibata Criterion (SHIBATA): (RSS/N) (N+2k)/N
Craven  and  Wabba  Generalized  Cross  Validation  method  (GCV):
(RSS/N)[1-(k/N)]-2
Rice Criterion: (RSS/N)[1-(2k/N)]- 1
Symbols:  RSS =  Residual sum of squares
N  =  Number of observations
k  - number of estimated parameters
See  Ramanathan  (1986) and Judge  et al.  1985, pp.  242-263 and  pp.
854-891.
6/  Please  note  that  only  regressions incorporating aggregate marginal
effective tax rate are presented here as this formulation allows us to
test the two alternative views on tax sensitivity of FDI in a simple
and  transparent  manner.  Results  from  regressions  incorporating
marginal effective  tax rate on  transfers and retained earnings  are
close to this simple formulation.- 35 -
Appendix A
The Data
Various Series on Foreign Direct Investment:
These  data  are  obtained  from Banco de Mexico,  Subdireccion  de
Inves.igacion Economica.
Index of Excess Credit Status (L):
These data are obtained from the U.S. Commerce Department.  The
index is calculated as follows:
A
i-  E
B + C - D + E
Where  A - Foreign Tax Credit Claimed
B - Foreign Taxes paid or accrued
C - Foreign Taxes deemed paid
D - Deductions for certain foreign  taxes.
E - Taxes carried over.
Marginal  Effective  Tax  Rates:  The  following  formulation  developed  by
Auerbach (1990) is used in the calculation of marginal effective tax rates.
[(r  +  6)(1 - r)/(1 - t)  - 6) - s
(r +  6)(1  - F)/(1  - t)  - 6
where  r - effective corporate tax rate
r - weighted average cost of capital
6  =  capital depreciation rate (assumed  value)
r  =  present  value  of  investment  creJits  and  depreciation
deductions  (based  on  a  sample  of  23  firms  reported  in
Schwartzman (1987))
t  =  corporate tax rate (Mexico)
s - rate of return to supplier of funds (calculated  based on data
from IMF: International Finance Statistics,  various issues).
Marginal  effective  tax  rate  for  transfers  (rt) utilizes  the  following
expression for the weighted average cost of capital (r).
i  (1  - t  ,  - Or - -m  XRRC)
Iu  u  u  m
r - b  m
max
+ (I  - b)  t  ll  min
L + J L  u - 36 -
where  b - fraction financed by debt
p  - real discount rate for equity
tm - Mexico corporate tax rate
tp - U.S. personal tax rate u
i  - U.S. nominal interest rate u
iu - U.S. inflation rate
m  Mexico inflation rate
XRRC - rate of Mexican pesos depreciation against the dollar
tmax  higher of U.S. personal income tax rate and the Mexican
withholding tax on interest payments
tm,=  smaller of Mexican and U.S. corporate tax rates
=  effective tax rate on  real equity return
For retained earnings:  r =  is utilized  in  the  effective  tax  rate
1 - +  formula.
Regulations (REGU):  Exchange rate premia is used as a proxy for regulation.
It is defined as:
REGU _  XRM - XRN
XRN
where  XRM - Market Exchange rate
XRN - Official Exchange Rate
Unemployment rates: U.S. data is from the Economic Report of the President
to  the  Congress  (various  issues),  whereas  the  Mexican  data  is  from  INEGI
unpublished statistics on unemployment rate in Mexico city.
Country Credit Ratings:  Country credit ratings is a composite index of the
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Table Al
Basic Statistics on Selected  Variables
Standard
Variable Name  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum
FDIT  422.37  817.51  -143.50  3215.20
FDIR  355.91  309.17  105.00  1265.00
CRM  30.39  10.63  18.00  64.00
tm  0.42  0.01  0.35  0.42
Tm  0.07  0.01  0.04  0.10
rm  0.39  0.15  0.25  0.72
tu  0.47  0.04  0.34  0.53
Tu  0.07  0.03  0.01  0.10
,>  0.32  0.14  0.09  0.51
MDM  0.13  0.05  0.07  0.23
REGU  0.53  0.96  -0.93  1.61- 39 -
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